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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
v.

)
]

Boyd Searle,

]

Appellee.

Case No- 20000274-CA

]
Priority 4
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT

A^

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellees dispute Appellant's designation of the standard of

review.

In response thereto Appellant would offer the following:

1.

Did the trial court err when it concluded that the
October 16, 1999 Tribal Court Order was unenforceable
because it "relates to and stems from" the May 22, 1998
Order?

Appellees argue that a Findings of Fact standard should
apply.

However, in the order which was drafted by Appellees and

approved by the trial court, the contested issue is identified a
conclusion of law (See Addenda B attached to Appellant's Brief).
Appellant would concede that if there are adequate findings, the
Appellate Court decides the matter for itself and does not defer
to the trial court's determination as to the law.
1

However, the

determination whether the foreign order is both final and valid
is a question of law which was left unresolved by the trial court
in its ruling.
2.

Did the trial court err in setting aside the Entry of
Judgment under Rule 60(b)?

Appellant would concede that generally a Rule 60 (b) Motion
is treated as a discretionary ruling.

However, there is no

discretion where there is no jurisdiction.

As to the timeliness

of the Rule 60(b) Motion, the issue is an issue of law.

Given

the lack of findings, the appellate court cannot determine
whether there was an abuse of discretion or not.

The appellate

court must either decide the issue for itself or remand for
further determinations.
(Utah 1997).
B.

Willev v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 230

Therefore, this issue involves questions of law.

TRANSCRIPT, RES JUDICATA, AND RULE 60(B) ISSUES
For purposes of this section and consistent with Appellant's

Brief, Appellant will use: (1) The term "Tribal Court" to refer
to the Fort Peck Sioux and Assiniboine Tribal Court; (2) The term
M

Juvenile Court" to refer to the Third District Juvenile Court;

and (3) The term "trial court" to refer to the Third District
Court from which this appeal was taken.

In reply to the issues

raised in Appellee's Brief, the following is offered:
ISSUE I:

APPELLEES ARGUE "THE APPELLATE COURT MUST AFFIRM
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BECAUSE
THE MOTHER FAILED TO PROVIDE A TRANSCRIPT"

Appellees raise an interesting issue with regard to the
2

transcript.

The case law and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure are clear that a transcript of pertinent
evidence is necessary.

In the instant matter, a transcript of

November 23, 1999 hearing was unnecessary.

Appellees fail to

identify critical facts that reveal that the transcript was
unnecessary.

A review of these facts is as follows:

Purpose of the November 23, 1999 Hearing
Appellees failed to properly identify the issues addressed
at the November 23, 1999 Hearing.

On or about the 18th day of

November, 1999, Appellees contacted the Court and requested that
a hearing be scheduled for November 23, 1999 on an "EXPEDITED MO
TO STAY."

See Docket at Page 4 (attached as Addenda C ) . On or

about November 22, 1999, Appellees drafted and served Appellant
with a copy of an "Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Rule 60
Motion."

See R. at 151 & 168.

Appellees "Emergency Motion for

Stay Pending Rule 60 Motion" was filed on November 22, 1999.

See

R. at 151 and Docket at Page 4.
On November 23, 1999, a hearing was held to address "the
Motion to Stay Enforcement."1

The "Emergency Motion for Stay

1

Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
Appellant would request that the Court take judicial notice of the
transcript of the November 23, 1999 Hearing. (A copy is attached as
Addenda A hereto). The original has been filed with the Court.
Under Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, "judicial notice may be
taken at any stage of the proceeding." The Original Transcript filed
herein satisfies "necessary information" requirement. The transcript
is "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to" the recording.

3

Pending Rule 60 Motion" specifically requested that the Court
stay enforcement of the August 23, 1999 Entry of Judgment so that
argument could be made on the "motion to set aside."

See R. 151.

Nowhere in the record does it state that the hearing was held to
address the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside.2

The order from the

November 23, 1999 Hearing provides that the Court only issued a
temporary stay "until further order of the Court."
(attached as Addenda B).

See R. at 445

The minute entry from the hearing also

states that the hearing was scheduled on the "motion to stay
enforcement."

See R. at 324 (attached as Addenda C) .3 The clear

2

References to the transcript are footnoted because the
Court has discretion to take judicial notice of the transcript.
Such discretion has not been exercised. A review of the
transcript also reveals that the was set to address the Motion
for Stay. The following language from the transcript
substantiates that the hearing was set to deal solely with the
Motion for Stay:
Page 2, Ln 18-20: Ms. Santana: Your honor, it's very simple.
I have a motion to stay enforcement of an order
that you entered on August 23rd.
Page 13, Ln 1: I'm going to grant a stay.
Page 13, Ln 9-25: Mr. Shirley: Judge, I'd just like a chance
to file a written response.
The Court: To?
Mr. Shirley: To the pleadings.
The Court: The motion to stay?
Mr. Shirley: Yeah.
The Court: All right. Counsel? Ms. Santana?
Ms. Santana: Well, I think it's unnecessary, but —
The Court: What do you mean you think it's unnecessary?
Ms. Santana: Well, you have - if you're going to look
at the issue and only order a stay temporarily, I
don't see wanting to respond to it.
See also R. at Page 15, Ins 10-17.
3

At page 5 of Appellees' Brief, Appellees state that "On
November 23, 1999, the trial court held a hearing on the
4

purpose of the November hearing was to deal with the Motion to
Stay Enforcement.
Appellant has not appealed the trial court's grant of the
temporary order of stay.

This Court can presume that the Order

of Stay was properly entered to give the trial court time to deal
with the Rule 60(b) Motion as requested by Appellees. However,
the temporary hearing did not address the propriety of the Rule
60(b) Motion which was not before the court for decision at that
time.
Language of February 7, 2000 Ruling
The language of the February 7, 2000 Ruling of the trial
court also substantiates this interpretation.

The Ruling states

"A hearing was held before the Court on November 23, 1999, on the
Emergency Motion to Stay."

R. 616. "At that time, the Court

granted the Motion to Stay temporarily, but deferred making a
final ruling on the Motion until counsel for the petitioner had
an opportunity to respond to the Motion..."

R. 616.

Based upon

this language, it is fairly clear that the trial court believed

grandparents Emergency Motion for Stay and Motion to Set Aside.
(R.324). After hearing argument at the hearing, the trial court
granted a stay and took under advisement whether to set aside the
judgment. (R. 324; 445-447). Nowhere in either part of the
record is Appellees' statements substantiated. The minute entry
at R.324 clearly provides that the hearing was on the Motion to
Stay. The Order and Minute Entry do not state that the Motion to
Set Aside was taken under advisement. The ten days for
responding to the Motion to Set Aside had not passed on November
23, 1999.
5

that the hearing on November 23, 1999 pertained solely to the
Emergency Motion to Stay filed by Petitioners on November 22,
1999.

Nothing in the ruling indicates that the Court used any

evidence from the hearing in making her decision with regard to
the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside•
The trial court ruling goes on to state "having reviewed the
moving and responding memoranda with respect to the remaining
motions, the Court rules as stated herein,"

R. 617.

The Court

does not state that it relied on the argument made at the
November 23, 1999 hearing.

In fact, nowhere in the record does

the trial court state that the November 23, 1999 hearing related
to the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside.

Rather, the Court

explains that it was relying on the written documents submitted
by the parties.
Testimony or Evidence at November 23, 1999 Hearing
A review of the minute entry demonstrates that no oral
testimony was taken at the hearing.4

There are no references to

any evidence being taken other than the documents found at R.
193-323 (which are primarily copies of cases and other orders
that are found in the record elsewhere-Appellees do not cite to
any of this evidence as supporting their position). It should be
clearly noted that Appellees do not argue that evidence was taken
at the hearing that bears upon the Motion to Set Aside.
4

A review of the transcript also shows that no oral testimony was taken.
6

Appellees only argue that the hearing was held and a transcript
should have been provided.

Appellees offer no proffer that there

was even relevant evidence offered at the hearing.
Relevant Evidence: Orders
The only true evidence relevant to the trial court's
findings and conclusions are: (1) The May 22, 1998 Tribal Court
Temporary Order (R.526); (2) The October 16, 1998 Tribal Court
Custody Decree (R. 2-4); (3) The November 19, 1998 Tribal Court
Order on Order to Show Cause (R. 5-12); (4) Judge Hanson's Order
of Dismissal (R. 174-77); and (5) Judge Hanson's July 15, 1999
Letter (R. 378-79).

There is no other evidence that is relevant

to the Rule 60(b) Motion which was submitted to the trial court.
Appellees do not assert that any other relevant evidence exists.
There is no parol evidence that changes the documents. A review
of the ruling makes it clear that Judge Lewis' determination was
based upon these documents.

R. 616-18.

Utah Rules of App. Proc.: Rule 11 Case Law
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
provides that "if the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript
of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion."

The key

issue of the rule is whether evidence is relevant to a finding or
a conclusion.

The cases are in uniformity that this Court
7

presumes the finding/conclusion to be correct when the evidence
relevant to such a finding/conclusion is not included.

As stated

in King v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1287
(Utah App. 1993), Rule 11(e)(2) "requires counsel provide the
appellate court with all evidence pertinent to the issues on
appeal,"

The issue on appeal in the instant matter concerns the

Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside, not the Appellees' "Emergency
Motion to Stay Enforcement Pending a Ruling on Rule 60(b)
Motion."
On page 9 of their brief, Appellees cite to King, Prudential
Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104 (Utah App. 1990), and
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987).

These cases are

readily distinguishable from the instant case in that there were
identifiable transcripts that were needed, but were not included.
In King, the appellant had failed to include a transcript of the
proceedings before an administrative agency.

In Prudential/ the

appellant had failed to include the relevant portions of a
transcript from the trial.

In Fackrell, the appellant failed to

provide a transcript of hearing on a Rule 60(b) motion.

In each

case, the missing transcript related to issues before the
appellate court.
The cases seem to be in uniformity in holding that the
evidence has to be pertinent to the issues on appeal.

See

Ravburn v. Ravburn, 738 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah App.1987) (appellant

8

only provided 30 pages of the transcript from trial which only
represented a "tiny fraction of the testimony" where the findings
based upon the testimony was at issue)/ Intermountain Power
Agency v. Bowers-Irons Recreation Land & Cattle Co., oo» J- /OI
250, 252 (Utah App.,1990) (appellant failed to provide transcript
from trial where the findings based upon I. lit- letsl iirumy war ,il
issue); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah App.,1992)
(appellant failed to provide copies of the t ranscript front a
deposition which was central to the appeal issue); State v.
Bvrns, 91 3 P.2d 981 , 987-88 (Utah App.,1995) (appellant failed to
provide a transcript of a hearing on an entrapment hearing where
the issue wair tin out raprnprit ruling);

In re C.J.F.T. v. J.W.,

1999 WL 33244660 (Utah App.,1999) (failed to provide a transcri pt
of the adoption consent proceeding where the viability of the
consent was the issue on appeal);

State v. Simmons,

l

P ?d 1228,

1231 (Utah App.,2000) (failed to provide transcript from Rule 23B
hearing where 23B hearing orders were being contested);

Shields

v. Santana, 2000 WL 33250567 (Utah App.,2000) (Unpublished)
(Summary Judgment Motion on a 3 ease in which a hearing was held
and findings entered upon the hearing, appeal issue was adequacy
of evidence il the hearing); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998,
1000 (Utah App. 1989) (Transcripts were not . ,.!*-.-_- trial w Mi 23 witnesses and 398 exhibits and I"7 page court
memorandum and 234 page findings of i :

9

.

*

' */*

and verdict, issue on appeal were findings).

In Santana, the

Court noted that the ""judgment, which was based upon a hearing,
found xno merit sufficient to withstand judgment for [Appellee]
based on any of the affirmative defenses or the one remaining
counterclaim....' No transcript of the hearing has been provided
to this court, so ^the trial court's ruling on the evidence must
be presumed correct.'" citing

to Howard v. Howard/ 601 P.2d 931,

934 (Utah 1979).
The argument and references to the record set forth herein,
clearly demonstrate that the hearing had no bearing on the Motion
to Set Aside.

If the Motion had been dealt with in the November

23, 1999 hearing, Appellees' argument may have some merit.
Accordingly, Appellees' argument lacks sufficient merit.

This

Court has been given all the evidence relevant to the issues on
appeal as set forth above.
ISSUE II: APPELLEES ARGUE "THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
BECAUSE RES JUDICATA BARRED ENFORCEMENT
Appellant does not dispute that the case law cited to by
Appellees with regard to Res Judicata

contains the applicable

elements and explanations of the doctrine of Res

Judicata.

Appellant would dispute the application of Res Judicata
matter before the Court. Appellees argue that .Res

to the

Judicata

precluded the trial court from enforcing the October Tribal Court
Order because Judge Hanson had refused to enforce a temporary

10

order of custody in. ••.* separate action. Appellees' argument
assumes that the trial court ruled that Res Judicata

applies.

There i^ no M.irJi J J niicni t" i on in Uie record.
However, Appellees fail to point out some very distinct
issues llidt nit * k r Mo- application of the principles of Res
Judicata

inappropriate.

First, the issue before the trial court

in the instant matter and the issue before Judge Hanson in the
previous matter are distinct.

The issue before Judge Hanson

dealt with the enforcement of the temporary May 22, 1998 tribal
court order.

The issue before Judge Lewis in the instant matter

dealt with the enforcement of the October 16, 1998 permanent
Decree of Custody

While both sets <.l '\rders /-ire related to

custody of Appellant's minor child, the issues are different
because the issue in enforcement ol the order, and enforcement
relates to the order, not to custody.

The following table

illustrates the differences:
j JUDGE HANSON ACTION

JUDGE LEWIS ACTION (October)

Type: Temporary Custody Order

Permanent Order of Custody

Notice: Appellees were not
served with a Motion prior to
hearing with notice of
hearing.

Appellees were served with a
Petition for Sole Custody See
R.at 8 (para.27)
(uncontested).

Pleading: Tribe's Ex Parte
Oral Motion

Appellant's Written Petition
for Sole Custody

Court Proceeding: Hearing on
Ex Parte Motion

Default Judgment, Application,
and Entry of Default

11

|

Document: An Order with
Jurisdictional Findings and
Temporary Custody Transfer

Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law

Issue Before Utah Court: Did
the May 22, 1998 order comply
with the validity and finality
requirements under the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act.

Issue Before Utah Court: Did
the October 16, 1998 order
comply with the validity and
finality requirements under
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act,

As demonstrated by the table, there are several distinctions
that have to be looked at between the October and May orders.
Despite Appellees' assertions to the contrary, the action before
Judge Lewis did not involve the same issue because the order was
different.

The action did not involve the issues which Judge

Hanson found to preclude enforcement, to wit: (1) A lack of
notice; and (2) Lack of compliance with the Foreign Judgment Act.
Res Judicata

is not applicable to the instant matter, even though

the parties are the same because the issues are different as they
relate to each order.
The second issue that Appellees conveniently ignore and do
not argue to the Court is that Judge Hanson found that:
the above-entitled action is dismissed without
prejudice as to any Order entered subsequent to the May
22, 1998 Order which has been entered by the Fort Peck
Tribal Court and the dismissal of this action in no way
precludes subsequent enforcement of Orders through a
filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act... See R.
at 177 (para. 3 of Order) (emphasis added).
Contrary to Appellees' assertions, the validity of the May
22, 1998 Tribal Court Order has nothing to do with the

12

enforcement of the subsequent permanent orders (as noted by Judge
Hanson) and the subsequent orders do not countermand Judge
Hanson': Order.
Order.

The orders were entered prior to Judge Hanson's

Judge Hanson did not find that the subsequent proceedings

lacked due process or that his order would preclude enforcement.
In fact, Judge Hanson found just the opposite ( i
order did not preclude subsequent enforcement).
appealed this ruling.

Appellees never

As a fu] 1 y ] Itigated and undi sturbed

ruling, Judge Hanson's ruling does have Res

Judicata

effect and

is the 1 riw nf the case as between tiie pail ies with regard to that
specific ruling5.
The 01 il :;y i ssi les w:i t h regard to the October Decree is whether
the order complied with the validity and finality requirements of
the foreign judgment act.

Since res

judicata

is inapplicable,

this court should focus on the validity and finality analysis
required under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act,
findings as to this issue.

There are no

However, through their silence,

Appellees appear to concede that the validity and finality
requirements of 11 Ie I J1:a 1 i F o r e i gn Judgment Ac 1: were satisfied.

5

Appellees take some issue that this action was
commenced after Judge Hanson denied enforcement of the May 22,
1998 Tribal Court Order. However, Appellees were aware that
Judge Hanson in a hearing on March 9, 1999 stated that he
expected that the October and November Orders would be filed in
accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and that M one of
his colleagues'' would deal with it appropriately. This intent
was confirmed in a subsequent letter. See R„ at 370.

13

The trial court's order does not address these two core
requirements.

There is no evidence before this Court or the

trial court which would dispute that the October custody order
was both final and valid.

The issues are all based upon

documentary evidence which this Court can decide as easily as the
trial court (in that there is no need for testimony).

This Court

can either remand on that issue or decide the issue for itself
after disposing of the res

judicata

and "relates to and stems

from'' issues.
ISSUE III: APPELLEES ARGUE "TRIAL COURT'S ORDER SETTING
ASIDE JUDGMENT MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION'7
Appellees argue that the appropriate standard of review is
abuse of discretion in relation to a Rule 60(b) Motion.
Appellant does not dispute that this would be the general rule.
However, whether the Rule 60(b) Motion is timely or not is not a
matter a of discretion.

Rather, this involves a question of law

which does not allow deference to the trial court.

With regard

to the grounds for a Rule 60(b) Motion, the trial court is given
discretion in determining whether the Motion should be granted.
In the instant matter, as argued below, the Motion was not filed
in a timely manner and the trial court failed to make appropriate
factual findings. Appellant sets forth Appellees' four separate
arguments in this regard as set forth below:
Argument #1:

Appellees Argue That Appellees' Motion to Set
Aside Was Timely

14

Appellees argue in essence i hat because 1 hr Anqnst ??*, 1999
Entry of Judgment stated that the Tribal Court Order was given
full faith and credi t, the date for filing a Motion to Set Aside
would run from the August 25, 1999 Order and not from an earlier
date

However, this argument ignores the central crux of

Appellant's argument below in the trial court and on appeal
before this Court

The central crux of the argument is that if

Appellees wanted to prevent the order fioin gaining tu.ll fcutii and
credit, Appellees had to file within one hundred twenty days
(ninety days for Rule 60(b) and thirty days for the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act) of the filing of the foreign judgment action.
The Utah Foreign Judgment Action is very clear that the
Appellees, as the judgment debtor, had thirty days to obtain a
stay of the order.

Under Utah Code Anno. § 78-22a-2 provides

that:
A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the
same effect and is subject to the same procedures,
defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings
for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying as a
judgment of a district court of this state.
Under tlie Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the foreign judgment
obtains the status of a lien if a stay of execution is not
granted with the thirty days.
4

See Utah Code Anno. §§ 78-22a-l &

Under this scheme, the Tribal coin L m d e i ^ became effective

on July 15, 2001, thirty days after filing.

If tribal court

orders had been monetary j udg inei Its (as i s g e n e i a 1 1 ;v c o n 1:eiiip] at< E ;d

by the language in the Foreign Judgment Act), Appellant would
have had the right to file a Writ of Execution or Garnishment
after the thirty days.

In such a case, the appeal of the full

faith and credit issue would lie when the judgment became
recognized with the same enforcement as a Utah Judgment.
By the same token, the Tribal Court Orders became effective
after thirty days filing and any Motion to prevent the full faith
and credit from attaching must have been filed within 90 days of
the effective date.

Unlike a Writ of Execution or Garnishment,

there is no formalized mechanism for enforcing a custody order.
The preferred mechanism is through a directive to law
enforcement.

The Entry of Judgment provided such a mechanism.

A

review of the Application for an Entry of Judgment (attached as
Addenda G of Appellant's Brief) clarifies that Appellant's
position has always been that the Entry of Judgment was merely
the enforcement mechanism.
Contrary to Appellees' argument, the statutory framework
governs the time periods, as was argued before the trial court.
The Order does state that the tribal court decree was given full
faith and credit, but that is only an announcement to the world.
The statute provides that the full faith and credit begins after
thirty days when enforcement may begin.
As stated in the last sentence of the Entry of Judgment, the
primary purpose of the order was to direct law enforcement to

16

enforce th>. . - i*:.

Tl le Entry correctly states that the thirty

days had passed and that the order was given full faith and
credi t,

Appe] 1 ee's ar gument in this regard is incorrect. It

should also be noted that the trial court did not make any
This

conclusion as to the timeliness of the Motion
governed by the law set forth in Argument #4
Argument #2:

would be

julid.

Appellees Argue That The Timeliness Issue Is
Frivolous

Appellant' s arg umei it i s not fi i vol oi is as defi ned by Rule 33
because the time periods are governed by the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act, not t he Kntry of Judgment.

Appellees ignore the

Utah Foreign Judgment Act throughout their argument and fail to
address the core issues in relation thereto.

Appellees also do

not cite the court to the key statemei it in I. he AppJ i Cdt i mi for
Entry of Judgment (R. 67) , "petitioner hereby requests that the
Court enter the foreign judgment for enforcement

m nt. ah, ."

Appellant's argument is not frivolous in that it is grounded in
fact and law.

Law enforcement should refrain from enforcing a foreign
judgment absent some declaration by a Utah Court. This policy is
in line with the Foreign Judgment Act.

17

Argument #3:

Appellees Argue that Sufficient Grounds To
Set Aside Must Be Presumed In That Appellant
Did Not Provide Transcript

Appellant would incorporate by reference the argument set
forth in Section I supra

as to the need for a transcript.

This

issue is not meritorious in that the issues decided in the Rule
60(b) Motion were determined upon the pleadings before the Court.
The record currently before the Court is clear that no evidence
was taken as to the Rule 60(b) Motion at the November 23, 1999
Hearing.

Accordingly, this issue does not prevent the Court from

addressing the issues raised by Appellant on appeal.
Argument #4:

Appellees Argue that Appellant Did Not
Preserve Issue For Appellate Review

Appellees argue Mthe appellate court cannot reverse on this
issue [trial court's failure to make findings as to the specific
Rule 60(b) Motion grounds] because the [Appellant] failed to
preserve the issue by failing to make a timely objection7 in the
trial court." A modicum of research would have revealed that
Appellant's argument is clearly frivolous in that it is not
supported by law and fact. In Sittner v. Schriever, 2 P.3d 442,
445 (Utah 2000),

the Utah Supreme Court held:

Defendants correctly state the general rule that
failure to raise an argument before the trial court
precludes a party from raising that argument on appeal.
{Citation
ommitted).
However, this rule does not
7

An objection would not have tolled the time for appeal.
Therefore, a mere objection would have done no good. A Rule 59
Motion would have been necessary.
18

require a party to file a post-judgment motion before
the trial court as a prerequisite to filing an appeal.
See, e.g.,
Duaan v. Jones, 124 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah
1986) (per curiam) (" 'It is settled that ... a rule 59
motion is [not] a condition precedent to appeal from
final judgment/
(quoting Nature Conservancy v.
Nakila,4 Haw.App. 584, 671 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Ct.
App.1983). It would be absurd to require Sittner to
raise such an issue of appellate procedure before the
trial court, which would have lacked authority and
jurisdiction to decide the issue. Moreover, the merits
of Sittner?s appeal, which we do not address today, can
be summarized as two issues: (1) whether the trial
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants, and (2) whether defendants are entitled to
attorney fees. Sittner!s arguments on these two issues
are fully briefed in his own summary judgment
memorandum, his memoranda in opposition to defendants1
motions for summary judgment, and other pleadings filed
below. He therefore preserved below the issues he now
raises on appeal.
"f'ltf" lssiii-.s regarding the Rule 60(b) Motion were properly
raised and briefed before the trial court.
at Pages 2, 30-40.

See Appella . •

The trial court had ample opportunity t:e ru.e

on all the issues raised bi I t failed to make appropriate
determinations as to the grounds for granting a Rule 60 (b)
Motion.

Mosdell v. Mosdell, 2001 WT. 361723, (Utah App. 2001),

this Court made the following observations:
"[T]he trial court in exercising its discretion must
make the findings of fact explicit in support of its
legal conclusions." Willev v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 230
(Utah 1997). "It is essential that such determinations
be based on proper findings of fact and conclusions of
law." Montova v. Montova, 696 P.2d 1193, 1194-95 (Utah
1985). Here, the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are insufficient to support its
order modifying the divorce decree. With such meager
findings, this court cannot meaningfully review whether
the trial court abused its discretion. See Willev/ 951
P.2d at 230.
"Although this Court has power in an equity case such
19

as this to weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court, we decline to do
so where we have no means of knowing upon which facts
the trial judge relied in entering his judgment,"
Montova, 696 P.2d at 1195 (citation omitted). Thus, we
vacate the order entered below and remand this case to
the Search Term Begin trial court Search Term End with
instructions to Search Term Begin enter Search Term End
written Search Term Begin findings Search Term End of
fact.
Clearly, this Court must either substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court or remand on the issue of the grounds to
sustain a Rule 60(b) Motion.

In Willev v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226,

(Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that "if the
appellate court determines that the findings of fact are
insufficient to support the conclusion, the appellate court
normally remands the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings."

Appellants concede "the trial court did not enter

findings or conclusions as to the grounds for setting aside the
order."

See Appellees' Brief at 16.

The Rule 60(b) Motion is

critical to setting aside the Entry of Judgment and a decision
not to enforce a foreign judgment that had obtained full faith
and credit.

Accordingly, this issue, second only to the grounds

for denying full faith and credit, is dispositive of the entire
matter.
Given the frivolous nature of Appellant's position and the
little research that would have been required to correctly
identify the issues to the court, an award of attorneys fees is
hereby requested on this issue.

20

CONCLUSION
Appellant would ask the Court to either reverse the trial
court based upon the timeliness issue and fact that Judge
Hanson's order does not preclude enforcement of the foreign
judgments.

In the alternative, Appellant would request remand

for further proceedings with the instruction that the ruling that
the May 22, 1998 order precluded enforcement is erroneous and
that the trial court must analyze the matter within the rubric of
the validity and finality issues.
DATED this j^_
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-oooOoooTHE COURT:
her being present.

I don't know if we can do this without
I guess we can give it a shot.

Do you have clients here, Mr. Shirley?
MR. SHIRLEY:

No.

She lives in Montana.

THE COURT:

Have we got the video on?

THE CLERK:

It's on.

THE COURT:

Are you there?

Are you there?
Are you there?
MS. SANTANA:
THE COURT:

I am here.
All right.

We've got the speaker

phone, obviously, on and also the video recorder.
This is a motion hearing, so if you want to state
your position first, Ms. Santana, and then we'll let Counsel
respond.
MS. SANTANA:

Your Honor, it's very simple.

I

have a motion to stay enforcement of an order that you
entered on August 23rd.

And the grounds for it is that the

petitioner requested that you enter an order giving full
faith and credit to the tribal court order that contradicts
findings and conclusions of law that Judge Hanson has
already ruled upon on July 26th and insofar as res judicata.
THE COURT:

Well, we looked at the issue, I

2

1

remember, looked at Judge Hanson's file before I ruled.

2

my perception is it was consistent with Judge Hanson's

3

ruling.

How do you view it as res judicata?
MS. SANTANA:

4

So

Well, Your Honor, Judge Hanson's

5

ruling specifically says that the May 22nd order by the

6

tribal court is not enforceable and that my clients were not

7

given notice or due process when custody was transferred.
Your order entered the trial court findings that

8
9

my clients were in violation of that order, and that

10

contradicts what Judge Hanson has said, that they were not

11

provided due process.

12

them.

13

THE COURT:

14

who are the parties?

Now, in the case before Judge Hanson,

MS. SANTANA:

15
16

And it was not enforceable as to

Boyd Searle.

For some reason, I

don't know what the reason was, Jayni Searle (inaudible)

17 I Boyd Searle.

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. SANTANA:

So it's the same parties?
It's one of the same parties.

And

20 I the action before you, she names Boyd Searle and his wife,

21

Dorothy Searle.

22 I
23

THE COURT:

So why are the two different actions

pending?

24

MS. SANTANA:

25

THE COURT:

Why are they pending?
Why are there two different actions -•

1

M S . SANTANA:

That y o u need to ask t h e p e t i t i o n e r .

2

He just turned around after Judge Hanson d e c l i n e d to enforce

3

that May 22nd order and found that it was e n t e r e d w i t h o u t

4

due process of law.

5

entered findings, the p e t i t i o n e r turned around and filed

6

a n o t h e r action in y o u r court asking s p e c i f i c a l l y that he

7

g i v e full faith and credit to an order that s a y s the M a y

8

22nd, 1998 order w a s enforceable and that m y c l i e n t s

9

violated it and, y o u k n o w , basically that they w e r e

H e said it in open c o u r t .

When you

10

wrongfully m a i n t a i n i n g c u s t o d y of the child as far as that

H

M a y 22nd order.

12

Judge Hanson said.

A n d that specifically c o n t r a d i c t s what

13

THE C O U R T :

14

MR. S H I R L E Y :

15

Counsel?
Y o u r Honor, are y o u r e a d y for m y

argument?

16

THE C O U R T :

17

MR. S H I R L E Y :

Yes.
A l l right.

First of a l l , I've got

18

these documents and the o r d e r s and stuff that w e n t in.

19

regard to --

20

THE C O U R T :

21

MR. S H I R L E Y :

22

THE C O U R T :

23

MR. S H I R L E Y :

With

Y o u m a y need to speak u p , C o u n s e l .
Huh?
Y o u ' l l need to speak u p .
Sorry.

With regard to t h e res

24

judicata issue, in o r d e r to b e res j u d i c a t a , y o u h a v e to

25

have the same issue o r the same claim t h a t ' s b e i n g r a i s e d .

The May 22nd order was a temporary order that was entered by

1

the tribal court upon accepting jurisdiction.

2

The October 16th order was issued pursuant to the

3
4

filing of a petition for sole custody in the tribal court on

5

September 8th, which was nearly three or four months after

6

the May 22nd order.
Additionally, the -- I think, by analogy, if the

7
8

Court were to look at it, if this Court were to issue --

9

were to have a petition for custody pending forth and a

10

motion for temporary custody and the Court granted the

11

motion for temporary custody, and then subsequently went on

12

to adjudicate the petition for custody on a more permanent

13

basis and for some reason the motion was found to be

14

defective and the Court made findings within the

15

adjudication on the petition that it had granted the motion,

16

that wouldn't make the subsequent order granting the

17 | petition defective.
18 I

The May 22nd involved custody but it did not

19

involve permanent custody as the October 16th order does.

20

They're two different claims, they're two different issues,

21

and --

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. SHIRLEY:

24

THE COURT:

25

cases, isn't it?

The same child, isn't it?
It's the same child.

And the issue was custody in both

THE COURT:

1

It is.

But the second one was based

2

upon the petition for custody, which was served upon

3

respondent's counsel.

4

an ex parte motion by Mr. Gary Bowdrey of the tribal court

5

when they accepted jurisdiction.

6

pleadings.

7

is, number one, they were in tribal court.

8

involved custody.

9

findings that it had previously entered the temporary order.

The first one was based upon, what,

There were two different

The only thing that ties them together at all
Number two, they

And, number three, the tribal court made

But res judicata does not apply in this type of

10
11

situation because their issue -- the claims are not the

12

same, the issues are not the same.
THE COURT:

13
14
15

16
17

How are the claims and issues

different?
MR. SHIRLEY:

Okay.

The issues are different on

the May 22nd order because the claim was that it was
defective because they didn't have notice of the

18

proceedings.

The October 16th order was based upon a

19

petition which respondent's counsel was served with.

20

THE COURT:

21

with custody, right?

And the underlying issues had to do

22 |

MR. SHIRLEY:

23 I

THE COURT:

24

MR. SHIRLEY:

They did.

They did.

In this case, it's the same thing.

That's the same thing, but what

25 I you're looking at is that May 22nd order's never been set

1

aside.

A n d just b e c a u s e the court

2

a f i n d i n g that it entered that o r d e r , that d o e s n ' t m a k e

3

a d j u d i c a t i o n o n the p e t i t i o n for c u s t o d y i n v a l i d .

4

be similar

5

t e m p o r a r y o r d e r and then, l a t e r , in its p e r m a n e n t

6

it s a y s ,

7

e n t e r e d a n o r d e r o n this d a t e ; it h a s n ' t b e e n

8

w i t h , " e v e n if s u b s e q u e n t l y that o r d e r is set a s i d e ,

9

t e m p o r a r y o r d e r , it doesn't

i m p u g n t h e final

But t h e p o i n t

that

that I c a n ' t get p a s t

Why have we got two different
MR. SHIRLEY:

We

order.

12

c a s e s , same

is

in o n e c a s e .

thing?

W e l l , a n d w h a t w e d i d is we filed a

14

petition

15

of 1 9 9 8 .

16

The juvenile court action which originated

18

findings

complied

it s e e m s l i k e t h i s all s h o u l d h a v e b e e n h a n d l e d

17 I o r J u d g e

the

It w o u l d

"Here's the p r o c e d u r a l h i s t o r y of t h i s c a s e .

11

13

makes

-- like I said, if this C o u r t h a d e n t e r e d a

THE COURT:

10

-- the t r i b a l court

f o r w r i t of a s s i s t a n c e b e f o r e J u d g e H a n s o n in J u n e
That was before the O c t o b e r order w a s

entered.

all this, Judge--

-- let m e b a c k u p .
There was a juvenile court action

19

transferred

j u r i s d i c t i o n to t h e t r i b a l

20

respondents

a p p e a l e d that t r a n s f e r r e d

21

i n t e r i m , w e h a d f i l e d the p e t i t i o n

22

THE COURT:

23

MR.

SHIRLEY:

which

court.

The

jurisdiction.

f o r w r i t of

In the

assistance.

And that has been the Judge Hanson
The Judge Hanson case.

--

When

24

J u d g e H a n s o n saw t h a t the C o u r t of A p p e a l s h a d not r u l e d

25

on the a p p e a l , he waited until he h a d a ruling before

he

yet

1

would issue anything.

The petition for custody wasn't filed

2

until September, after the - - a t the same time that they had

3

dismissed their -- their termination action which they'd

4

filed in juvenile court.

So the petition came at a

subsequent time.

5

In reality, the petition in tribal court was the

6

tribe's, it was not my client's.

7

THE COURT:

8

Do you want to respond to that,

Counsel?

9

MS. SANTANA:

10

Your Honor, I have Judge Hanson's

11

order in front of me and it specifically says the May 22nd

12

1998 order transferring custody is not entitled to full

13

faith and credit.

14

Mr. Shirley's petition in this court was that you

15

give full faith and credit to the tribal court order, which

16

specifically contradicts that and says that my client

17

I wrongfully maintained custody in contravention of the May

18 J 22nd order.
ig

i full faith and credit to that, that the May 22nd order was

20
21

And so you have entered a finding by giving

wrongfully disobeyed by my client

J

THE COURT:

22 I

MS. SANTANA:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

All right.

Where is

(Inaudible).
Where is the child or the children

now?
MS. SANTANA:

Your Honor, Mr. Shirley went to the

8

child's school when he -- this is what I understand.

He

went to the school and picked him up and gave him over to a
person from the Indian tribe to transport him to Montana.
In the process, that person decided that he was not going to
transport him and dropped him off at the house of a
relative.
THE COURT:
or the children?

Let me ask again:

Where is the child

Do you know, Mr. Shirley?

MR. SHIRLEY:

I don't know.

They won't disclose

MS. SANTANA:

He's at the home of a relative, Your

that.

Honor.

And I reported it to DCFS the day that he was

dropped off.

He's not in the custody of my clients,

however.
THE COURT:
MS. SANTANA:
of mouth.

But your clients know where he is.
My clients know where he is by word

They have not had any involvement in what has

happened.
THE COURT:
MS. SANTANA:

Is there anything else?
Basically, Your Honor, I disagree

with Mr. Shirley's explanation of the law.

I think that the

issue is specifically exactly the same issue, the issue that
he brought before this Court was that you give full faith
and credit to an order that says that the May 22nd order was
wrongfully disobeyed.

And that issue Judge Hanson has ruled

9

1

| upon and said that the May 22nd order is not enforceable and

2

I not entitled to full faith and credit in Utah.

3

THE COURT:

Well, there's also another case - - a t

4

least I assume it's a separate case -- and this was one that

5

was assigned to Judge Medley and is styled 934903601,

6

Searle

7

decree of divorce dealing with custody issues.

v.

Boyd

Carl

Searle,

8

What about that?

9

MS. SANTANA:

where Judge Medley has entered a

The thing there, Your Honor, is that

10

that Boyd Searle is actually a different person.

11

Jayni Searle's ex-husband, who has now died.

12

are the grandparents
THE COURT:

13
14

I see.

That is

And my clients

Would you like to say anything

further, Counsel?

15

MR. SHIRLEY:

16

In Crowther v. The District

17 I County,
18

Jayni

I would, Your Honor.

Court of Salt

Lake

54 P.2d 243 Utah 1936, the court held that:

" Disobedience of an order made by the court within its

19 J jurisdiction and power is contempt, although the order may
20 l be clearly erroneous.

Consequently, the authorities are

21

made in accordance that, where the court has jurisdiction

22

over the parties and of the subject matter of a suit and the

23

legal authority to make the order, a party refusing to obey

24

it, however erroneously made, is liable for contempt.

Such

25 I order, though erroneous, is lawful within the mfeaning of

10

1

contempt statutes until it is reversed by an appellate

2

court.

3

"The fact that a witness may disagree with the court on

4

the propriety of its ruling, of course, is no excuse for not

5

complying with it.

6

correctness of an adverse ruling is by appeal and not by

7

disobedience."
THE COURT:

8
9

The proper method for challenging the

Well, there's no question about that

being the state of the law.

But at this point in time, what

10

I'm more interested in -- far more interested in than

11

assessing who's in contempt and why is making a

12

determination of what the proper method of the stating is,

13

And I'm not at this point in time.

I'm inclined to grant

14

the stay, not agreeing to either of your positions beyond

15

that, and take a closer look at where we are and whether a

16

second file should have been set up or whether everything

17

was taken care of in the preceding action.

And I'm not sure

18 I what the answer is.
19

MR. SHIRLEY:

Can I also give you this letter from

20 J Judge Hanson in which he addressed this complaint of
2i | bringing the -- excuse me -- of bringing the subsequent
22 I matter.

And in it he says, "With regard to the complaints

23

of Ms. Santana that Mr. Shirley has brought this matter

24

before Judge Lewis, please be advised that I do not find any

25

impropriety in that regard, as it was my intention to only

11

address the May 22nd, 1998 order and the writ of assistance
that was requested based thereon.
"If any subsequent order has been properly domesticated
under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and is otherwise
enforceable, I am confident that Judge Lewis, who apparently
is assigned to the case, will handle the matter in
accordance with the facts as she finds them in accordance
with the law."
So even Judge Hanson didn't believe -- understood
that there would be a subsequent action.
MS. SANTANA:
THE COURT:

May I respond to that, Your Honor?

Yes.

MS. SANTANA:

Judge Hanson, however, is stating

there that he's only dealing with the May 22nd order.
THE COURT:
MS. SANTANA:

That's right.
He's not looking at those other

orders, and those other orders specifically have findings
within them that say that the May 22nd order was proper and
that my clients disobeyed it.

And so he's not dealing with

the issue on the merits; he's basically saying that if there
are other orders that are otherwise enforceable, that is
something that you would decide.
THE COURT:

Well, right.

I think that was

Counsel's position, that what Judge Hanson had dealt with
did not dispose of all the issues.

12

I'm going to grant a stay.

1

I would like

2 immediately for the information, however, about the
3 whereabouts of the child to be shared so everybody has that
4 information.

And I will take this under advisement and look

5 at it and see if we've erred or if we're on the right track
6 here.
Is there anything either of you would like to say

7

8 in response to that?
MR. SHIRLEY:

9

Judge, I'd just like a chance to

10 file a written response.
11

THE COURT:

To?

12

MR. SHIRLEY:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SHIRLEY:

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. SANTANA:

To the pleadings.
The motion to stay?
Yeah.

All right.

Counsel?

Ms. Santana?

Well, I think it's unnecessary,

17 but -18

THE COURT:

What do you mean you think it's

19 unnecessary?
20
21

MS. SANTANA:

Well, you have - - i f you're going to

look at the issue and only order a stay temporarily, I don't

22 see wanting to respond to it.
23

THE COURT:

Because he's entitled to state his

24 position just as you were.
25

MS. SANTANA:

Okay.

Thatf s fine.

13

1

THE COURT:

In writing, as well as orally.

2

How long do you need, Counsel?

3

MR. SHIRLEY:

4

THE COURT:

I just need until Monday.
I'll give you a week to file that, and

5

I will look again at M s . Santana's pleading and yours, and

6

I'll consider what both of you had to say today.

7

meantime, we'll pull Judge Hanson's case, which I don't have

8

before me.

And in the

9

It seems to me that we did look at the earlier,

10

but we'll do it again and make sure that we're correct in

11

the meantime with the very short-term stay in place to allow

12

me to revisit the issue.

13 I

Anything further?

14

M S . SANTANA:

Well, Your Honor, I do have one

15 I question
16 i

THE COURT:

17 I

M S . SANTANA:

18

Yes,
My clients do know where the child

is

19

THE COURT:

20

M S . SANTANA:

Yes.
And they have not had any contact

21

with him because they don't want to, in any way, disobey the

22

Court's order.

23

him?

Are they now authorized to have contact with

24

THE COURT:

25

M S . SANTANA:

No,
Excuse me?

14

1

THE COURT:

No.

2

MS. SANTANA:

3

THE COURT:

No?
We're not changing anything, we're

4 just staying things at the moment to determine whether or
5 not the Court has erred, whether or not things need to be
6 adjusted.

But I do think that all sides ought to be in the

7 same position vis-a-vis information about the child.
8 Everybody's entitled to know where the child is.
9
10

MS. SANTANA:
THE COURT:

Okay, Your Honor.
And do you want to do an order,

11 Ms. Santana, covering what we've worked on today, or some
12 little issue we've addressed?

In the meantime, I'm going to

13 take full benefit of the excellent pleadings that have been
14 filed by you and what I assume Mr. Shirley may be filing in
15 addition and make sure that I have not erred and take
16 another look at this.

Because I want to be sure I'm

17 correct.

And I appreciate your calling it to my attention.

18

Is there anything further?

19

MS. SANTANA:

Your Honor, just one little, small

20 issue that I'd like to address.
21

THE COURT:

22

MS. SANTANA:

23 serve your pleadings.

Yes.
And that's as to how they would
Mr. Shirley has recently begun

24 sending me everything certified mail and recently has sent
25 me something, and I don't know if it's in this case or not,

15

that I was not able to get because there was no one at the
office yesterday when it came.

And I would just like

service to be by mail
Well, certified mail is by mail.

THE COURT:

Are

you saying you'd like a simple mail ing as well as a
certifd.ed mailing, if he chooses to use certified mail P
MS. SANTANA:
THE COURT:

Exactly.
All right.

MS. SANTANA:

Because now I'm in the position of

having to go to the post office to go pick up the mail now.
THE COURT:
reasonable request.

All right.

Well, I think that's a

If Mr. Shirley wants to use certified

mail, he's welcome to do that, but I'm going to ask you also
to send via regular mail the same pleadings.
MR. SHIRLEY:
THE COURT:
MS. SANTANA:
THE COURT:

That's fine.
Okay?

Anything else, counsel?

That's all. Thank you.
All right.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAYNI SEARLE,
:

ORDER OF STAY

:
:

Case No. 99-690-7234FJ

Plaintiff,
vs.
BOYD SEARLE, and
DOROTHY SEARLE,.

Judge: Leslie Lewis
Defendants.

:

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on November 23, 1999, before the
Honorable Leslie Lewis, Third District Court Judge, pursuant to Respondent's
Emergency Motion for Stay. Present at said hearing were Jim C. Shirley, counsel for
Petitioner; and Maria Cristina Santana, counsel for Respondents via telephone. The
Court having reviewed the pleadings, and the Court having heard argument by the
respective parties and being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That the Court's August 25, 1999 Order entitled "Entry of Judgment" is

stayed and shall not be enforced by the parties or law enforcement until further order of
the Court;

pqQ

2.

Petitioner and Respondents shall share information regarding the minor

child so that the parties have equal access to information regarding the child.
/

•' SE-

&u- 1999
DATED this _ £ day of W-*BYTH^GOURT

Honorable Leslie Lewis
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to form

K...

Jim C. Shirley

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this^yday of /\}w 1999,1 caused to be served by mail
and fax a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Jim Shirley
9 East Exchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fax: 359-0181
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Case No. 20000274CA
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Appellees.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAYNI SEARLE,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
LAW & MOTION

vs.

Case No: 996907234 FJ

BOYD SEARLE

Clerk:

Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

LESLIE A. LEWIS
November 23, 1999

chells

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JIM C SHIRLEY
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARIA CRISTINA SANTANA
Video

HEARING
TIME: 10:50 AM At this time the motion to stay enforcement of
the order is argued to the court.
Based on the arguments, the Court grants the motion to stay.
The Court will look at the issue of the second filing of a
complaint, and make a determination if the Court has erred or if
there needs to be an adjustment in the Courts ruling.
Mr Shirley may file a written response to the motion to stay.
Ms Santana is to disclose the location of the child. All parties
are to know where the child is at.
There is no changes as to the status of contact with the child.
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THIRD DISTRICT COUKT - B>IASALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAYNI SEARLE v s .
CASE NUMBER 9 9 6 9 0 7 2 3 4 F o r e i g n Judgment

CURRENT ASSIGNED J ^ G E
LESLIE A. LEWIS
PARTIES

Plaintiff - JAYNI SEARLE
P O BOX 702
Wolf Point, MT 59201
Represented by: JIM C SHIRLEY
Defendant - BOYD SEARLE
4906 South 4460 West
R ^ e s e n ^ b y f MARIA CRISTINA SANTANA
Defendant - DOROTHY SEARLE
4906 South 4460 West
Reams, UT 84118
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE
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Amount Due:
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Amount Due:
n
Amount Paid:
l-°?
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0- 00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION
Amount Due:
n
Amount Paid:
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Amount Credit:
°- 00
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Balance:

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES
Amount Due:
3.00
Amount Paid:
3.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES
Amount Due:
3.50
Amount Paid:
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0.00
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0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.75
0.75
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION
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2.00
Amount Paid:
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0.00
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
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Amount Credit:
Balance:
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0.75
0.00
0.00

CASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
06-15-99
06-15-99
06-15-99
06-15-99
06-15-99
06-15-99
06-15-99
06-15-99
06-24-99

Judge LEWIS assigned.
Filed: Affidavit of Impecuniosity
Filed: Complaint
Filed: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree (from
Fort Peck Tribal Court)
Filed: Order Re: Order to Show Cause (from Fort Peck Tribal
Court)
Filed: Affidavit in Support of Entry of Foreign Judgment
Filed: Notice of Judgment (copy of file mailed to defendants)
Case Disposition is Judgment on Pleading
Disposition Judge is LESLIE A. LEWIS
Filed: Response to notice of judgment and affidavit in support
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susies
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of entry of foreign judgment
janeilm
)6-24 - 9 9 Filed: Response to notice of judgment and affidavitin support
of entry of foreign judgment
chells
Filed:
Notice
of
intent
to
file
responsive
pleading
to
9
9
)6-25
respondent's pleadings
janeilm
)6-25 - 9 9 Filed: Objection to June 21, 1998 Letter & motion to strike
June 21, 1998 letter
janeilm
37-06 - 9 9 Filed: Memorandum in support of entry of foreign judgment and
in response to motion for consolidation
margeneg
3 8 - 1 3 - 9 9 Filed: Notice to submit and request for decision
chells
3 8 - 1 3 - 9 9 Filed: Application for entry of judgment
chells
3 8 - 2 5 - 9 9 Filed order: Signed Entry of judgment
margeneg
Judge llewis
Signed August 25, 1999
0 9 - 0 8 - •99 Filed: Entry of Judgment §
margeneg
1 0 - 0 4 - •99 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.00
nancyka
1 0 - 0 4 - •99 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.00
nancyka
1 0 - 0 4 - •99 CERTIFICATION
Payment Received:
2, 00
nancyka
1 0 - 0 4 - •99 CERTIFIED COPIES
Payment Received:
1, 00
nancyka
1 0 - 0 4 - •99 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.00
heaths
1 0 - 0 4 - •99 Fee Account created
Total Due:
3.00
heaths
1 0 - 0 4 - •99 CERTIFICATION
Payment Received:
2, 00
heaths
1 0 - 0 4 - 9 9 CERTIFIED COPIES
Payment Received:
3, 00
heaths
1 0 - 2 2 - 9 9 TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER scheduled on October 26, 1999 at 03:00 PM
in Fourth Floor - N44 with Judge LEWIS.
chells
chells
10-26-99 TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER Cancelled.
Reason: ATD requested continuance.
janeilm
11-03--99 Filed: Notice of deposition
janeilm
11-03--99 Filed: Notice of deposition
kimbers
Total Due:
3.50
11-09--99 Fee Account created
kimbers
Total Due:
0.75
11-09--99 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.00
kimbers
11-09--99 Fee Account created
kimbers
Payment Received:
3.50
11-09--99 CERTIFIED COPIES
kimbers
Payment Received:
0.75
11-09--99 COPY FEE
kimbers
Payment Received:
2.00
11-09--99 CERTIFICATION
janeilm
11-10--99 Filed: Notice of change of address
11-10--99 Filed: Motion for protective order and motion for attorneys
janeilm
fees
11-12--99 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
betsyc
11-12--99 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
betsyc
11-12--99 Filed: Response in opposition to motion for protective order
janeilm
11-12--99 Filed: Response in opposition to motion for attorneys fees
janeilm
11-12--99 Filed: Response in oppostion to motion for protective order
janeilm
11-12--99 Filed: Memorandum in support of respone in opposition to motion
janeilm
for protective order
janeilm
11-12-99 Filed: Response in opposition to motion for attorneys fees
11-12-99 Filed: Memorandum in support of expedited motion and order to
janeilm
compel
janeilm
11-12-99 Filed: Ex parte motion for expedited disposition
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CASE NUMBER 996907234 Foreign Judgment
11-12-99 Filed: Notice of motion for expedited disposition
janeilm
11-12-99 Filed: Request for ruling on motion for expedited disposition janeilm
11-16-99 Filed: Reply to opposition to motion for protective order and
motion for attorney's fees
janeilm
11-16-99 EXPEDITED MO TO STAY scheduled on November 23, 1999 at 10:00 AM
in Fourth Floor - N44 with Judge LEWIS.
chells
11-18-99 Filed: Objection to ex parte motion for expedited disposition
and motion to compel (request for hearing)
janeilm
11-18-99 Filed: Notice to submit for decision
janeilm
11-22-99 Filed: Amendment to response in opposition to motion for
protective order
chells
11-22-99 Filed: Emergency motion for stay pending rule 60 motion
chells
11-22-99 Filed: Motion to set aside judgment and motion for declaratory
judgment
chells
11-22-99 Filed: Memorandum in support of motion to set aside judmgent
and motion for delcaratory judgment
chells
11-22-99 Filed: Amendedment to response in opposition to motion for
protective order
chells
11-22-99 Filed: Documents responding to 11/22/99 emergency motion for
stay
chells
11-22-99 Filed: Unsigned Expedited motion and order to compel
chells
11-23-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law & Motion
chells
Judge:
LESLIE A, LEWIS
Clerk:
chells
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JIM C SHIRLEY
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARIA CRISTINA SANTANA
Video

HEARING
TIME: 10:50 AM At this time the motion to stay enforcement of
the order is argued to the court.
Based on the arguments, the Court grants the motion to stay.
The Court will look at the issue of the second filing of a
complaint, and make a determination if the Court has erred or if
there needs to be an adjustment in the Court's ruling.
Mr Shirley may file a written response to the motion to stay.
Ms Santana is to disclose the location of the child. All parties
are to know where the child is at.
There is no changes as to the status of contact with the child.
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